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TOO BIG TO JAIL OR TOO ABSTRACT (OR RICH?) TO CARE 
VICTOR B. FLATT∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For much of human-recorded history, Thomas Hobbes’s observa-
tion that the life of man is “nasty, brutish, and short” has seemed 
true.1  For example, new research indicates that certain hunter-
gatherer societies maintained a relatively abundant life with little 
work, but population numbers were kept down by savage warfare.2  By 
Hobbes’s time, agriculture had been invented, supporting larger 
populations, but the ability to co-opt brute-force work, such as agricul-
ture, meant that many people still had what we would consider very 
difficult lives.3  From the latter parts of the Industrial Revolution to 
the post-World War II era, however, a larger segment of society has 
enjoyed middle-class, prosperous lifestyles.4  It is in this last few hun-
dred years of human existence that what we consider the “common 
law” comes into play.5  It is important to ground our discussion in this 
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 1.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63–66 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1987) (1651) (de-
scribing the natural state of mankind). 
 2.  Cf. Victor B. Flatt, This Land Is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W. VA. 
L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2004) (explaining “the synergistic capacity of members in a human pack 
to produce more food per person when acting together than by acting alone,” but noting 
that there was “fierce warfare over the best fishing, hunting, and gathering areas[, making 
l]ife in pre-history . . . a zero sum game” (footnotes omitted)). 
 3.  Cf. id. at 16–17 (“During the development of much of the common law, ancient 
protections for chieftains and/or royalty . . . slowly expanded to “commoners,” to so-called 
yeoman farmers . . . .”). 
 4.  See June Carbone, Unpacking Inequality and Class: Family, Gender, and the Reconstruc-
tion of Class Barriers, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 527, 538, 542 (2011) (“Class consciousness in-
creased with industrialization.  Yet, labor tensions between industrialists and unions may 
have obscured the more dramatic change taking place in American families during the 
industrial age, namely the reordering of family life to encourage investment in an expand-
ing middle class.” (footnote omitted)). 
 5.  See Flatt, supra note 2, at 6, 11–18 (“[W]hat we consider our historic or common 
law rights in torts and property are critical responses to our societal and human evolu-
tion . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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common law, since before that period, enforcement, whether envi-
ronmental or otherwise, made little sense.6  There was scarce rule of 
law, and then only for the very wealthy and propertied, which was just 
a small subset of the human population.7  Homicide rates in Europe 
during the Middle Ages, for example, were thirty times higher than 
they are today.8 
Over time, the protections of the law were extended to more and 
more people,9 and by the end of the nineteenth century, the rule of 
the common law was complete in the Anglo-American system.10  
Though governed by civil law, many other countries’ legal systems re-
flect this collection of rights-based law governing the interactions of 
individuals with each other.11  Under a classical theory of common 
law, then, our courts of law could “apply[] a complete, coherent, and 
formal body of law, police the boundaries of legislative authority and 
define the ground rules for interaction among private individuals.”12 
Another important strand of human history that in turn engaged 
with and helped create the legal system we have today is the human 
propensity for groups and connection.  Traced to an evolutionary ad-
vantage, human group activity may be one of the most important el-
                                                        
 6.  See id. at 12, 21 (suggesting that “[t]he world into which humans evolved must 
have been a very insecure place,” in part because “there was less interest in some environ-
mental amenities (such as wilderness or vistas) in older times because of other social con-
cerns” (footnote omitted)). 
 7.  See Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on Terrorism & Anti-Terrorism Law & Lit-
erature, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1069–70 (2003) (discussing the oppression of “the peo-
ple,” which represented the “law” in France during the Middle Ages); Ricardo Gosalbo-
Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications for the European Union and the 
United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 229, 237 (2010) (“The Middle Ages were a long and tu-
multuous period and the citizens during this time were not always law-abiding.  Indeed, 
feuds were legal in the Middle Ages and law often regulated less and left more liberty than 
our present laws.”). 
 8.  Steven Pinker, The Decline of Violence: Taming the Devil Within Us, 478 NATURE 309, 
309 (2011).  
 9.  Flatt, supra note 2, at 16–17. 
 10.  See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 405 (2004) (explaining that the “systematization of American 
law” that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century).  
 11.  See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Property as a Natural Right and as a Conventional Right in Consti-
tutional Law, 29 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 201, 203, 274 (2007) (noting that “eight-
eenth-century guarantees of property rights reflected distinct but largely parallel rhetoric 
of property as an absolute right in both civil law and common law traditions,” but that state 
courts in the United States “drew upon the natural rights theories of civil law theorists 
such as Grotius and Pufendorf” to develop a natural rights jurisprudence for the protec-
tion of property rights). 
 12.  Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004). 
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ements of humanity.13  Fostering such group cooperation in turn im-
plicates important social roles and bonds that members of the group 
are expected to follow.14  Failure to do so could lead to punishment, 
including exclusion from the group, which has traditionally been a 
serious punishment.15 
When we combine the basic human needs for community and 
connection with the emergence of a more equitable society, we arrive 
at the system of law and society with which we are familiar today—a 
society where the law grants everyone under its jurisdiction particular 
“rights” and governs the interaction and potential collision of these 
rights.16  It is within the context of this historical framework that we 
place our story and questions of Too Big to Jail. 
Why is it that we do not, in the eyes of many, have effective en-
forcement of important legal principles governing our financial sys-
tem and our environment, health, and safety?  I posit that at least in 
the environmental realm, the impacts of environmental harm have 
come to seem less immediate and threatening, and therefore are seen 
as less of a threat to the social order.17  In such circumstances, the 
public zeal, which is expressed in calls for better laws, better enforce-
ment, and public pressure, generally has waned.  As Paul Stern ob-
served in his review of studies concerning environmental attitudes, 
community norms and expectations are one of the factors associated 
with “environmentally significant behavior.”18 
                                                        
 13.  See Flatt, supra note 2, at 13 (“All evidence indicates that humans lived together in 
small societies, family groups, or tribes. . . .  Humans are, and from available scientific evi-
dence, always have been, pack animals.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 14.  See, e.g., Carol Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing New-
Fangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 45, 49 (1999) (“Critically important [to the development of community re-
gimes for managing common property] are opportunities for mutual monitoring and so-
cial leverage; small group size helps to produce these opportunities . . . .”).  
 15.  See, e.g., Clare E. Lyon, Note, Alternative Methods for Sentencing Youthful Offenders: 
Using Traditional Tribal Methods as a Model, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 211, 219–23 (2006) (ex-
plaining that North American Indian tribes did, and still do, use banishment as punish-
ment for “transgress[ing] social boundaries”). 
 16.  See, e.g., Flatt, supra note 2, at 25 (“The law is quite clear in what rights an individ-
ual has in property and how far that right extends if there is a conflict. . . .  The contours 
of the right are definitive and do not depend on a balancing of societal costs and bene-
fits. . . .  The only exception is when this might bump up against a right historically recog-
nized as more important, such as the protection of life . . . .”). 
 17.  See infra Part II.B. 
 18.  Paul C. Stern, Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior, 56 J. 
OF SOC. ISSUES 407, 415–17 (2007) (discussing contextual forces, which include interper-
sonal influences and community expectations, as causal variables of environmentally sig-
nificant behavior). 
 1348 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1345 
Related to this notion of the impact of community norms on en-
vironmental behavior, and perhaps even more important, is the ero-
sion of the equitable idea of society, which has been happening in the 
United States since at least the 1980s.19  This erosion has allowed cer-
tain segments of society to separate from the shorter- and longer-term 
environmental harms that we now face.  In other words, our “com-
munity,” which was essentially the majority of the public when the ma-
jor U.S. environmental laws were passed in the 1970s, is now frag-
mented into smaller communities and interest groups with newly 
outsized conceptions of the role of the individual.20 
Part II of this Article will examine the experience of environmen-
tal harm through the public lens in the 1970s and how this has 
changed from the 1980s through today.  Part III of this Article will 
analyze the re-emergence of income inequality in the 1970s and how 
this in turn impacted the societal conceptualization of protection 
from harm, in particular from environmental, health, and safety 
harms.  Finally, Part IV of this Article will examine the implications of 
this societal conceptualization of protection from harm for how envi-
ronmental protection and enforcement might be improved, or what 
will have to change for that to occur. 
Though I will attempt to examine historical facts, societal reac-
tions to those facts, and changes in social policy, I am not a trained 
historian, economist, or anthropologist.  Nevertheless, my own obser-
vations have convinced me that these social science factors are incred-
ibly important to how we make and enforce environmental law.  In 
this Article, I will offer my own observations about what this can mean 
for the law, and hope that others will be able to further examine such 
issues in this context. 
I am convinced that it will only be through a reconceptualization 
of the true environmental harms that we still face and a rethinking of 
values governing our social contract, that we may muster public zeal, 
which in turn will backstop strong enforcement to protect our envi-
ronment and public health.21  As famously noted by Jean Jacques 
Rousseau: “The problem is to find a form of association which will de-
fend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods 
of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, 
may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.”22  Unless 
                                                        
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  See infra Part III. 
 21.  See infra Part IV. 
 22.  JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 11–12 (E. P. 
Dutton & Co., Inc. 1950) (1762) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
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we find some social compact and some social construct for enforcing 
our environmental values for all, then at least for some, a “nasty, brut-
ish and short” life will again become all too common. 
II.  ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS: THEN AND NOW 
A.  The Beginning: 1962–1978 
The beginning of the modern environmental movement is often 
traced to the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) of 196923 and the passage of the Clean Air Amendments of 
1970.24  Certainly the flurry of laws that included the Clean Water 
Act,25 the Endangered Species Act,26 the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act,27 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act28 represents a unique point in time 
in American environmental history.29  In the 1970s, “[f]rustrated by 
the nation’s seeming inability to control the fouling of our water, air, 
and land, Congress cast aside prior, less ambitious regulatory ap-
proaches and passed a series of pollution statutes that were sweeping 
in their scope and uncompromising in their rigor.”30 
What was going on right before, during, and right after the pas-
sage of these laws?  In 1962, Rachel Carson published the book Silent 
Spring,31 which eloquently combined the everyday experience of hear-
ing songbirds with the claim that insecticides were weakening the egg 
structures of these very birds such that they could no longer survive 
                                                        
 23.  Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331–
4335, 4341–4347 (2006)). 
 24.  Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407–7414, 
7525, 7541, 7571–7574, 7603–7609, 7641–7642 (2006)); see CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, WILLIAM 
F. FUNK & VICTOR B. FLATT, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (3d ed. 2010) 
(“The year 1970 was a watershed in environmental law.  On January 1, President Nixon 
signed into law the National Environmental Policy Act; . . . and on the last day of the year, 
the Clean Air Act became law.”). 
 25.  Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1294–1297, 1281a (2006)). 
 26.  Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1531–1544 (2006)). 
 27.  Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976). 
 28.  Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 4611–4612, 4661–4662 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911a, 9601–9628, 9651–9652, 9654–9675 
(2006)). 
 29.  See William L. Andreen, Of Fables and Federalism: A Re-Examination of the Historical 
Rationale for Federal Environmental Laws, 42 ENVTL. L. 627, 628–29, 633–34 (2012) (“The 
decade of the 1970s witnessed a veritable explosion of environmental law.”). 
 30.  Id. at 628. 
 31.  RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (First Mariner Books 2002) (1962). 
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and be part of our lives.32  According to Lorus and Margery Milne’s 
contemporaneous book review in The New York Times, Silent Spring was 
a call to the public to get rid of poisons that will destroy life on 
earth.33  The reviewers noted the importance of Carson’s book, the 
huge reaction from the public when part of it was published in The 
New Yorker, and, in a foretaste of the future, the backlash from certain 
industries.34 
In Silent Spring, Carson wrote that every human is subjected to 
dangerous chemicals for the sake of some perceived public good.35  
The programs using these chemicals often had extremely negative 
side effects, such as the anti-gypsy moth programs that led to the 
death of numerous fish, crustaceans, and birds.36  According to the 
Milnes’ review, Carson’s book clearly demonstrated that the benefits 
of the chemicals we used did not outweigh their disastrous costs, once 
these costs were understood.37 
Then, in 1969, seven years after the publication of Carson’s book, 
the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio caught fire.38  An oil slick on 
the water burned intensely below two railroad bridges spanning the 
river.39  As described in the article Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing 
a History of Environmental Protection, a fire on the Cuyahoga was noth-
ing new; in fact, the river had reportedly burned as early as 1868.40  As 
a consequence of the economic value of a river flowing through a ma-
jor city, the Cuyahoga River had been a convenient and free sewer for 
                                                        
 32.  See generally id. at 3 (attempting to explain “[w]hat has already silenced the voices 
of spring in countless towns in America”). 
 33.  Lorus Milne & Margery Milne, There’s Poison All Around Us Now, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
23, 1962), http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/10/05/reviews/carson-spring.html. 
 34.  See id. (discussing how, with the publication of parts of Silent Spring in The New 
Yorker, “a gentle author was transformed into a controversial one,” and quoting an anony-
mous source from the Food and Drug Administration who stated that Carson’s book was 
“‘one-sided’”). 
 35.  See CARSON, supra note 31, at 15–16 (expressing concern that “every human being 
is now subjected to contact with dangerous chemicals” due to “the sudden rise and prodi-
gious growth of an industry for the production of man-made or synthetic chemicals with 
insecticidal properties”).  
 36.  See id. at 156–61 (“The gypsy moth program shows what a vast amount of damage 
can be done when reckless large-scale treatment is substituted for local and moderate con-
trol.”); Milne & Milne, supra note 33 (reporting on Carson’s observation that “gypsy-moth 
campaigns . . . killed fish, crabs and birds as well as some gypsy moths”).   
 37.  See Milne & Milne, supra note 33 (“[Carson’s] book is a cry to the reading public 
to help ban private and public programs which by use of poisons will end by destroying life 
on earth.”). 
 38.  Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental 
Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (2002). 
 39.  Id. at 96–97. 
 40.  Id. at 95, 101 (explaining that “the 1969 fire was less severe than prior Cuyahoga 
conflagrations”). 
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the industry of the entire city for decades.41  According to one ac-
count, the river was filled with so much oil and other pollution that it 
was completely devoid of life.42  It should be noted that most major 
surface waters at this time, and for decades prior, were conceived of as 
little more than refuse dumps.43 
But changes were afoot.  Unlike prior incidents, “[t]he [Cuya-
hoga River] fire attracted national media attention.”44  The image of 
the flaming river was burned into the nation’s consciousness and be-
came “a symbol of the earth in need of repair.”45  This image also be-
came one of the driving forces behind the 1972 Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments,46 and it “endures as a symbol of 
rampant environmental despoliation prior to the enactment of feder-
al environmental laws.”47 
The movement ignited by the Cuyahoga fire was stoked by a 1969 
oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, California.  On January 28th of 
that year, a Unocal oil rig, located six miles off the California coast, 
“spilled 3 million gallons of oil into the [Pacific Ocean].”48  A high-
pressure explosion on the rig caused cracks along the sea floor 
around a 3,500-foot-deep well.49  Oil spilled into the ocean for eleven 
days as workers desperately tried to contain the spill.50  Wind and 
ocean currents, however, spread the oil over thirty-five miles of the 
Santa Barbara coastline, coating the land with up to six inches of oil 
and leaving thousands of dead seabirds along the shoreline, as well as 
                                                        
 41.  Cf. id. (“Water pollution in the 1960s was a major environmental problem 
throughout the nation.  Many rivers were declared industrial streams, used predominantly 
for commercial purposes and the disposal of industrial waste.”). 
 42.  Id. at 97 (describing coverage of the fire in Time magazine).  
 43.  James Salzman, Why Rivers No Longer Burn, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2012, 5:20 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/clean_water_act_40
th_anniversary_the_greatest_success_in_environmental_law.html (noting that “discharg-
ing raw sewage and pollution into our harbors and rivers has been common practice for 
most of the nation’s history”).   
 44.  Adler, supra note 38, at 90, 104 (“Compared to the 1952 inferno, the 1969 fire was 
nothing special, a freak accident that merited little local concern, but sparked national 
attention because of increased environmental consciousness throughout the country.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 45.  Id. at 90–91. 
 46.  Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1263, 1265, 1281–
1292, 1311–1326, 1328, 1341–1345, 1361–1376 (2006)). 
 47.  Adler, supra note 38, at 91 & n.10, 92. 
 48.  Dan Duray, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill of 1969: A Lesson In Offshore Drilling, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2008, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/ 
14/the-santa-barbara-oil-spi_n_112605.html.  
 49.  Keith C. Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill: A Retrospective, 64 
Y.B. ASS’N PAC. COAST GEOGRAPHERS 157, 157 (2002), available at http://www.geog.ucsb. 
edu/~kclarke/Papers/SBOilSpill1969.pdf. 
 50.  Id. at 158. 
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destroying kelp forests and displacing endangered birds.51  This event 
influenced the movement toward environmental protection that had 
gained strength from the Cuyahoga River fire.52 
Major environmental events in the 1960s and 1970s were not lim-
ited to water pollution.  Starting in the mid-twentieth century, pollu-
tion from automobiles noticeably changed the sky in Southern Cali-
fornia,53 and by the early 1970s, there were air pollution emergencies 
in Birmingham, Alabama.54 
In the mid-twentieth century, Southern California, specifically 
Los Angeles, became associated with smog that covered the entire 
city.55  Of course, true “smog,” as its name suggests, is created by a 
mixture of smoke and fog.56  Traditional eastern smog is composed of 
sulfur dioxides created from burning coal.57  California smog was cre-
ated from automobile exhaust; hydrocarbons from other forms of pol-
lution mixed with nitrogen oxides from automobile exhaust in the 
atmosphere.58  Large amounts of sunlight resulted in these chemicals 
                                                        
 51.  Id. at 158–59. 
 52.  See, e.g., Adler, supra note 38, at 91 (“Following on the heels of . . . high-profile 
events such as the oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, the 1969 Cuyahoga fire spurred 
efforts to enact sweeping federal environmental legislation.”); Clarke & Hemphill, supra 
note 49, at 160 (noting that U.S. Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel and President 
Richard Nixon “personally viewed the [Santa Barbara oil spill] damage” and arguing that 
this “undoubtedly influenced their opinions regarding . . . the newly emerging environ-
mentally conscious political movement”). 
 53.  Nathan Masters, L.A.’s Smoggy Past, in Photos, KCET SOCAL FOCUS (Mar. 17, 2011, 
3:00 PM), http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/history/los-angeles-smoggy-past-
photos-31321.html (writing that “[a]lthough a pristine view of the Hollywood sign may still 
elude Angelenos on most days, air pollution rarely cripples the city in present times as it 
did in the mid-twentieth century” and reporting that “[i]n the 1950s, automobile exhaust 
became a prime suspect” for the cause of the smog). 
 54.  See Thomas Spencer, An Old Cloud of Polluted Air Lifts from Birmingham’s Shoulders, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Nov. 13, 2011, 6:15 AM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/11/an_ 
old_cloud_of_polluted_air_l.html (noting that at nearly 2:00 AM on November 18, 1971, a 
federal judge in Birmingham “became the first judge in the country to invoke the emer-
gency powers section of the Clean Air Act”). 
 55.  Masters, supra note 53; S. COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., THE SOUTHLAND’S 
WAR ON SMOG: FIFTY YEARS OF PROGRESS TOWARD CLEAN AIR (1997), available at 
http://www.aqmd.gov/news1/Archives/History/marchcov.html (“On July 26, 1943, in the 
midst of World War II, Los Angeles was attacked—not by a foreign enemy, but a domestic 
one—smog.”). 
 56.  S. COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., supra note 55. 
 57.  See id. (“Los Angeles smog was unlike air pollution in eastern U.S. cities, where it 
was chiefly composed of sulfur dioxides from burning coal and heavy oil.”). 
 58.  See id. (reporting on the findings of Arie J. Haagen-Smit, a Dutch chemist, who 
determined in 1950 that the air pollution in California was the result of ozone created in 
the atmosphere from a “combin[ation of] hydrocarbons from oil refineries and the par-
tially unburned exhaust of automobiles with nitrogen oxides, a combustion byproduct”). 
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forming ozone, the primary molecule in California smog.59  In the 
1950s, this smog resulted in an odorous haze over the city, causing eye 
irritation in humans and widespread crop damage.60  One of the most 
noticeable impacts of this smog was the rapid deterioration of rubber 
tires on cars.61 
Unlike California, with its ozone-based smog, 1970s Pittsburgh 
saw more traditional coal-oriented air pollution.  Pittsburgh, which 
was one of the primary coal-processing cities in the nation as well as a 
famous steel-producing town, was so polluted that the city often had 
“remarkably poor visibility and dark days.”62  Environmental groups 
fought to control this pollution in the 1970s, with some impact, but 
the air did not really change until the iron and steel industries col-
lapsed in the 1980s.63  Similarly, Birmingham, Alabama had heavy coal 
and steel industries, which led to extreme levels of pollution.  The 
pollution in Birmingham was so severe that there were advertisements 
for moving out of the city (called the “smoke zone”) and into the hills 
(called the “o-zone”).64  Of course, air quality was not much better in 
the hills.65 
In 1978, “multicolored basement walls” and “purple lawns” sig-
naled problems in the Love Canal neighborhood of upstate New 
York.66  Starting in 1942, the Hooker Chemical Company began to 
                                                        
 59.  Id. (noting “that ozone, the primary ingredient in [California] smog, was . . . 
[d]riven by sunlight[, specifically] a photochemical reaction”). 
 60.  Id.; A. J. Haagen-Smit, Chemistry and Physiology of Los Angeles Smog, 44 INDUS. & 
ENG’G CHEMISTRY 1342, 1342–45 (1952), available at http://web.gps.caltech.edu/classes/ 
ese172/haagen_smit_1952.pdf. 
 61.  S. COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., supra note 55 (“After tire manufacturers no-
ticed that rubber deteriorated faster in Los Angeles than other areas of the country, re-
searchers at Cal Tech showed air pollution to be the cause.  They found that rubber ex-
posed to high smog levels cracked in just seven minutes.”); Haagen-Smit, supra note 60, at 
1342–43, 1345–46. 
 62.  Cliff I. Davidson, Air Pollution in Pittsburgh: A Historical Perspective, 29 J. AIR 
POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 1035, 1035 (1979). 
 63.  See Joel A. Tarr, Pittsburgh’s Environmental History, PITTSBURGHGREENSTORY.ORG, 
http://www.pittsburghgreenstory.org/html/history.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (“In 
the 1970s and 1980s, however, the efforts of the advocacy organization Group Against 
Smoke and Pollution (“GASP”), working to encourage local enforcement of the Clean Air 
Act, brought about some improvement.  But perhaps the most substantial air quality im-
provements came because of the collapse of the iron and steel industry in the 1980s.”).  
 64.  Steve Chiotakis, Birmingham Air Quality: A History, WBHM PUBLIC RADIO (Jun. 16, 
2008), http://www.wbhm.org/News/2008/Air_Quality_History.html. 
 65.  See id. (reporting that “it’s a misnomer that the ridges around Birmingham keep 
the bad air in one place” and that the “air quality [in the mountains] can be just as bad as 
it is in downtown Birmingham”). 
 66.  MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS: FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 134 
(1994). 
 1354 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1345 
dispose of chemical waste in this small neighborhood of Niagara Falls, 
New York.67  After the company was finished with the dumping in 
Love Canal, the canal was covered and eventually sold to the Niagara 
Falls School Board, while the surrounding land was used for housing 
developments.68  Chemical waste leaked into the soil and groundwa-
ter, raising concerns about increased health risks among the residents 
of Love Canal.69  Residents began to report odorous black sludge 
seeping into their homes; grass and shrubs were dying; and a stench 
was settling over the town.70  On August 2, 1978, the New York State 
Health Commissioner declared a public health emergency, and Love 
Canal came to the forefront of environmental issues in the United 
States.71 
In addition to chemical pollution, the decades of the 1960s and 
1970s also witnessed large-scale litter, with trash appearing in places 
not seen before.  Primarily the result of newly-invented temporary 
containers and increased travel, such litter despoiled many settings.72  
Though it did not result in specific federal laws, the litter did spur 
memorable and effective education campaigns.  For example, “Lady 
Bird Johnson’s ‘Keep America Beautiful’ campaign of the early 1960s 
culminat[ed] in the White House Conference on Scenic Beauty in 
                                                        
 67.  Id. (noting that between 1942 and 1952, Hooker Chemical “disposed of more than 
21,000 tons of chemical waste” in Love Canal). 
 68.  Id. (“[A]fter the canal became full, it was covered with earth and clay and deeded 
over to the Niagara Falls School Board for one dollar. . . .  The vacant land along the canal 
was developed into modest two- and three-bedroom homes . . . .”). 
 69.  See Lenore J. Gensburg et al., Cancer Incidence Among Former Love Canal Residents, 
117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1265, 1265 (2009) (“In 1976–1977, heavy precipitation 
led to a rise in the water table and preceded the surfacing of some of the buried waste.  
Subsequent environmental sampling in homes adjacent to the waste site detected numer-
ous volatile organic chemicals in basement air, suggesting a possible serious health threat 
via inhalation.” (citations omitted)); id. at 1270 (reporting “elevations of bladder and kid-
ney cancers [among former Love Canal residents,] especially . . . among residents poten-
tially exposed as children”).  But see LANDY, ROBERTS & THOMAS, supra note 66, at 133 
(“[N]o reliable epidemiological studies showed that [Love Canal] residents were subject to 
greater health risks than the population at large.”). 
 70.  Randy Alfred, Nov. 21, 1968: Love Canal Calamity Surfaces, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2008), 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/11/dayintech_1121#. 
 71.  LANDY, ROBERTS & THOMAS, supra note 66, at 133, 135 (observing that in 1980, two 
years after Love Canal gained worldwide media attention, Congress passed “legislation 
providing for the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste dumps and spills of toxic chemi-
cals”). 
 72.  Cf. Ginger Strand, The Crying Indian, ORION, Nov.–Dec. 2008, available at 
http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/3642/ (“[T]he beer indus-
try, . . . began turning to new ‘one-way’ or disposable bottles.  By the end of the 1950s, half 
the nation’s beer would be in throwaway containers.  Many of them were ending up as 
roadside trash.”). 
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May 1965.”73  On Earth Day in 1971, Keep America Beautiful 
launched a famous public service announcement (“PSA”) featuring a 
Native American man, commonly referred to as the “Crying Indian.”74  
In the PSA, a Native American man paddles a canoe down a pristine 
river and into a city harbor.75  The primeval nature of the river is jux-
taposed with the polluted industry in the harbor.  As the man pulls his 
canoe onto the shore, the narrator says, “Some people have a deep, 
abiding respect for the natural beauty that was once this country, and 
some people don’t.”76  Then, a bag of trash is thrown from a passing 
car and lands at the man’s feet, as a solitary tear rolls down his 
cheek.77 
A less solemn—but just as famous—commercial came out of 
Tennessee at around the same time.  The “Tennessee Trash” com-
mercial features a man driving through abundant litter, while he con-
tributes to the trash around him.78  Eventually, the bumper falls off of 
his rusted Corvair to reveal a license plate that reads “Trash.”79  
Throughout the commercial, a jovial song is playing, with lyrics such 
as, “Lord, there ain’t no lower class than Tennessee Trash.”80  The 
Crying Indian and the Tennessee Trash man became household 
names, showing the dire situation caused by the large amounts of lit-
ter in the United States.81 
In retrospect, these commercials and images also seem to reflect 
their time because of the use of what I call “equality” images—images 
where “black” and “white” are equal and where all achieve the bene-
                                                        
 73.  John S. Applegate, The Story of Reserve Mining: Managing Scientific Uncertainty in En-
vironmental Regulation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 49 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. 
Houck eds., 2005). 
 74.  Strand, supra note 72; Pollution Prevention: Keep America Beautiful—Iron Eyes Cody 
(1961–1983), ADVER. EDUC. FOUND., http://www.aef.com/exhibits/social_responsibility/ 
ad_council/2278# (last visited Apr. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Pollution Prevention].  But see 
Strand, supra note 72 (“It’s no big secret that the crying Indian was neither crying nor In-
dian. . . .  His long black braids were a wig, his dark complexion deepened with 
makeup.”).  
 75.  Strand, supra note 72; Pollution Prevention, supra note 74. 
 76.  Strand, supra note 72; Pollution Prevention, supra note 74. 
 77.  Strand, supra note 72; Pollution Prevention, supra note 74. 
 78.  Lisa Kass Boyle, Brief from Bonnaroo: Tennessee Trash, HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 
2011, 5:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisa-kaas-boyle/brief-from-bonnaroo-
tenne_b_900038.html; Tenn. Dep’t Transp. 1976, Tennessee Trash, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tu1B6kblecs (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
 79.  Boyle, supra note 78; Tennessee Trash, supra note 78. 
 80.  Boyle, supra note 78; Tennessee Trash, supra note 78. 
 81.  See, e.g., Strand, supra note 72 (“The crying Indian wept for our sins, and from his 
tears sprang forth a new Green Age.”). 
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fits of forward social progress.  Long before Benetton ads,82 images of 
different races championing a social cause were carefully cultivated, 
including, for example, an ad featuring Woodsy Owl and environ-
mental protection.83 
Thus, environmental despoliation and impacts on human health 
in the 1960s and 1970s were obvious and visible, and were thought to 
impact all people.  This entered the public consciousness in a massive, 
broad way.  For example, in 1971 and 1972, three Dennis the Menace 
comic books spelled out and visualized Dennis having adventures 
combating an oil spill, dams that could harm fish, water and air pollu-
tion, and trash.84 
Anything that can be described in the pages of a comic book has 
become an accepted part of the nation’s conciousness.  What then ac-
counts for the waning of environmental concern that we see? 
In his chapter “Public Opinion and Environmental Policy” from 
Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence, Riley Dunlap 
posits that a waning of environmental fervor among the public may be 
similar to the “issue attention” cycle visible in all social issues.85  In 
particular, Dunlap states “that a movement’s success in stimulating 
governmental action to solve a problem leads the public to believe 
                                                        
 82.  Robin Givhan, Benetton’s Rebirth, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 23, 2012, 4:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/23/benetton-s-rebirth.html (“[I]n the 
1980s, . . . the United Colors of Benetton called to mind socially conscious, multicultural 
advertising . . . .  Back then, Benetton was a youthful Italian brand that seemed . . . intent 
on riling middlebrow sensibilities with its bold statements on AIDS, religion, and rac-
ism . . . .”). 
 83.  See Jamie Lewis, Happy 40th Birthday, Woodsy Owl!, PE E L I N G  BA C K  T H E  
BA R K (Sept .  15 ,  2011),  http://fhsarchives.wordpress.com/2011/09/15/happy-40th-
birthday-woodsy-owl/ (depicting children of different races in a print ad with Woodsy Owl, 
urging other children “Give a hoot!  Don’t pollute!”); see also Harald Fuller-Bennett & Iris 
Velez, Woodsy Owl at 40, FOREST HISTORY TODAY, Spring 2012, at 22–23, available at 
http://foresthistory.org/publications/FHT/FHTSpring2012/woodsey.pdf (“Secretary of 
Agriculture Clifford Hardin officially launched the Woodsy Owl campaign on September 
15, 1971, which is now celebrated as Woodsy’s ‘birthday.’  A department press release ex-
plained the purpose of the new symbol: “Woodsy will work as a constant reminder to children 
and adults of positive ways in which pollution can be fought”). 
 84.  Hank Ketcham (w), (other creative contributor(s) unknown), Creative Contribut-
er(s), DENNIS THE MENACE 118 (Fawcett Comics Jan. 1972); Hank Ketcham (w), (other 
creative contributor(s) unknown), Creative Contributer(s), DENNIS THE MENACE 117 
(Fawcett Comics Nov. 1971); Hank Ketcham (w), (other creative contributor(s) un-
known), Creative Contributer(s), DENNIS THE MENACE 116 (Fawcett Comics Sept. 1971). 
 85.  See generally Riley Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 64–65 (J.P. Lester ed., 2d 
ed. 1997) (suggesting that “the issue-attention cycle has clearly been the most influential 
among those interested in public opinion on environmental issues” and describing the 
cycle as one in which “environmental problems . . . meet the fate experienced by most so-
cial problems—have a brief ‘moment in the sun’ and then fade from the public attention 
as newer problems take center stage on the national agenda”). 
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that the problem is ‘being taken care of.’”86  This may be particularly 
true when the government intervention does meet with visible suc-
cess. 
B.  Visible Harm Fades: 1980–Present 
After the passage and implementation of the major initial envi-
ronmental laws, we began to see some relief from the worst possible 
impacts of air and water pollution.87  The biggest emerging pollution 
problems, however, were significantly less visible.88  For example, 
though often associated with smog, current ground-level ozone is col-
orless and odorless, and thus can cause health problems without hav-
ing an obvious physical presence.89  As for water pollution, while there 
are still occasional fish kills, the problems related to uncontrolled raw 
sewage have given way to problems with run-off, which cause cumula-
tive harm in the shape of dead zones in far-away portions of large 
bodies of water.90  Furthermore, the stratospheric ozone layer was 
threatened, but that harm is not directly visible.91  There were also 
major American oil spills in 1989 and 2010,92 but aside from these, 
there were very few visible natural despoliations.  Of course, many 
natural disasters occurred, including heat waves, droughts, wildfires, 
floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes; while these events are consistent 
                                                        
 86.  Id. at 66. 
 87.  Cf. Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science Can 
Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 279, 281 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he First Wave 
approaches to environmental law clearly had some success, adding needed muscle to the 
exercise of setting quality-based goals,” which “d[id] a great deal for environmental quali-
ty”). 
 88.  See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization 
of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 118 (2001) (“Environmental law has 
succeeded in addressing the most visible environmental problems and, in so doing may 
have, ironically, contributed to a degree of complacency on the part of the public when it 
comes to less tangible, but potentially no less serious, environmental problems.”). 
 89.  See, e.g., Air Quality: Ground Level Ozone, OR. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, 
http://www.deq.state.or.us/aq/planning/ozone.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (discuss-
ing Oregon’s ozone maintenance plan). 
 90.  Arthur McAvoy, Environmental Law and the Collapse of the New Deal Constitution, 46 
AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 19–22) (on file with author). 
 91.  See Ozone, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ozone/ (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2013) (“The stratosphere, . . . extends upward from about 6 to 30 miles [from 
Earth.]  This natural shield has been gradually depleted by man-made chemicals like 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).  A depleted ozone shield allows more UV radiation to reach 
the ground . . . .”). 
 92.  SUSAN LYON & DANIEL J. WEISS, CTR. FOR. AM. PROGRESS, OIL SPILLS BY THE 
NUMBERS: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF EXXON VALDEZ AND BP GULF (2010), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2010/04/30/7620/oil-
spills-by-the-numbers/ (describing the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska and the 2010 
BP Gulf Coast rig explosion). 
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with the problem of global warming, they also occur naturally, and 
there is a great deal of public debate over the linkage between natural 
disasters and global climate change.93  According to James Hansen, a 
NASA scientist, “the scientific community realizes that we have a 
planetary emergency[, but i]t’s hard for the public to recognize be-
cause they stick their head out of the window and don’t see much go-
ing on.”94 
Environmental problems were also less “visible” because of the 
lack of focused media attention.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
most people got their news from the same place,95 and television 
shows and newspapers carried many major stories about environmen-
tal despoliation and visible harms.96  But after the initial media scruti-
ny calling for action, the media would typically turn to more “exciting 
news”.97  In fact, media attention to environmental issues declined 
significantly after the early 1970s.98  According to Everett Ladd and 
Karlyn Bowman, by 1995 “Americans remain[ed] committed to the 
goal of protecting . . . the environment, but they no longer s[aw] an 
urgent [and overt] problem.”99  We see a similar story with climate 
change, where reporting has dropped drastically.100 
                                                        
 93.  See, e.g., Margaux J. Hall, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change Adaptation 
and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 309, 318 (2012) (“The degree to which climate 
change will increase natural disasters is somewhat less clear, though the general prognosis 
is poor.  Although direct linkages may be difficult to identify in many cases, climate change 
creates systemic conditions for more frequent and more extreme weather events.”). 
 94.  Justin Gillis, Ending Its Summer Melt, Arctic Sea Ice Sets a New Low That Leads to Warn-
ings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at A8. 
 95.  Cf.  JAMES T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO SELL: HOW THE MARKET 
TRANSFORMS INFORMATION INTO NEWS 160 (2004)  (writing that in 1969, “[t]he average 
television household received seven channels,” so “[i]f viewers did not enjoy the hard news 
stories provided in the evening news programs, they had few other options on the dial,” 
and that “[a]t the dinner hour more than one-third of all television households watched 
the network evening news”).  
 96.  See Dunlap, supra note 85, at 71 (“[B]y the late sixties, environmental problems 
were receiving tremendous exposure in the media.”). 
 97.  See Dunlap, supra note 85, at 66 (“Most authors are rather vague about precisely 
why the public loses interest, but . . . the fact that the media typically turn to newer, more 
exciting issues [is] often mentioned.” (citation omitted)). 
 98.  Dunlap, supra note 85, at 78–79. 
 99.  EVERETT CARLL LADD & KARLYN H. BOWMAN, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
ENVIRONMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER EARTH DAY 2 (1995). 
 100.  See generally John Daley, Why the Decline and Rebirth of Environmental Journalism Mat-
ters, YALE F. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & MEDIA (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.yaleclimatemedia 
forum.org/2010/01/why-decline-rebirth-of-environmental-journalism-matters/ (“[W]hen 
it comes to coverage of climate change . . . the meltdown in mainstream news reporting 
couldn’t come at a worse time. . . .  [T]he ranks of reporters best equipped to cover these 
major environmental and climate change stories at most news outlets, particularly in local 
markets, are being decimated.”). 
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Whether because of success, less media focus, or a combination, 
these factors have decreased the visibility of environmental harm and 
the needs for change and enforcement to the average person.  This 
Article includes many references to visual images precisely because 
they were part of the experience of Americans at all levels.  Without 
these visuals, there was less perceived threat. 
As noted by Alice Kaswan, the remoteness of the threat means 
that people are less likely to focus on it.101  Less engagement is linked 
to under-enforcement.  Alexis de Tocqueville praised the early Amer-
ican legal system because the public investment in the law meant that 
the law was more likely to be enforced and not flouted.102  The more 
people believe something is not really harmful, the less likely they are 
to support controls on that activity, or strict enforcement of it.103  But 
scientists tell us that we face critical harms, even if they are not as ob-
vious as in the past.  Are we victims of a media or public opinion cy-
cle?  Is anything else at play? 
III.  EMERGENCE OF AN INDIVIDUALISTIC PARADIGM AND THE INCREASE 
IN INEQUALITY 
At the same time that visibility of harm was starting to decrease, 
another change was occurring.  Cass Sunstein has called the 1960s 
and 1970s the decades of the “rights revolution” because many prob-
lems were framed and seen as related to individual rights.104  Perhaps 
due to a stagnating economy in the late 1970s, a portion of the public 
turned away from environmental rights and began to focus more on 
the costs of environmental protection, while the Republican presiden-
tial administration under Ronald Reagan adopted a mantra espousing 
the ills of government regulation.105  Thus began the de-legitimizing 
                                                        
 101.  See Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change: Adaptation and Equity, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 
11125, 11139 (2012) (“Individuals could discount what appear to be inchoate, distant, and 
remote threats.”).  
 102.  See Bruce Frohnen, Tocqueville’s Law: Integrative Jurisprudence in the American Context, 
39 AM. J. JURIS. 241, 255 (1995) (“Americans identified with the law as the product of their 
own will more because they engaged in its enforcement than because it was an end prod-
uct of their (or the majority’s) will.  Thus, in America, citizens bent themselves to the law 
because they saw themselves (and in this Tocqueville felt that they were correct) to be 
obeying the law rather than a mere man . . . .”). 
 103.  Cf. LADD & BOWMAN, supra note 99, at 51 (“Clearly, the vast majority of our citi-
zens are environmentalists.  But we are now more inclined to think that for most Ameri-
cans, the urgency has been removed, and the battle to protect the environment is being 
waged satisfactorily.”).   
 104.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 24–27 (1993). 
 105.  See id. at 30–31 (discussing the calls for deregulation that accompanied the eco-
nomic recession of the late 1970s and 1980s); Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Comment, Why 
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of “Progressivism.”106  Along with this, we saw the beginnings of the so-
called “rational” approach to regulation through cost-benefit analysis, 
with less focus on protection and the rights of the public.107  This ap-
proach emphasizes the rational individual decision maker.108 
This “rational” regulation was formalized through the executive 
orders that began with President Jimmy Carter and were then 
strengthened under President Reagan.109  Contrary to the assumptions 
present at the passing of the major environmental laws—that envi-
ronmental values are priceless and that regulation can only come 
from “public debate and participation”110—economists and policy 
makers began to embrace the ethos of the rational decision maker in 
government.111  Although this cost-benefit analysis is not explicitly 
against the ethos of environmental protection, it certainly indicates 
that the concept of a “priceless” inalienable right to health and envi-
ronmental protection is false.112  Cost-benefit analysis is also particu-
                                                        
Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
1135, 1147–48 (2008) (explaining President Reagan’s deregulation efforts). 
 106.  See Mark Lilla, The Great Disconnect, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at BR1 (reviewing 
CHARLES R. KESLER, I AM THE CHANGE: BARACK OBAMA AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM 
(2012) and writing that “Reagan did in fact restore (then overinflate) America’s self-
confidence, and he did bequeath to Republicans a clear ideological alternative to [the] 
Progressivism [of the New Deal and Great Society]”). 
 107.  See generally Hardin, supra note 105, at 1147–48 (noting that President Reagan’s 
executive order regarding deregulation “was urged by ‘technocrats,’ who believed in ra-
tional regulatory decisionmaking and expected implementation of [cost-benefit analysis] 
to preclude unreasonable regulation”); see also Robert Bejesky, An Analytical Appraisal of 
Public Choice Value Shifts for Environmental Protection in the United States and Mexico, 11 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 285 (2001) (“The deregulatory era of environmental protec-
tion eventually evolved into a market approach to environmental regulation . . . by allow-
ing industries and individual companies to determine how much the right to pollute was 
valued via permitting these individual actors to make cost-benefit decisions within the con-
text of a given level of environmental standards.”). 
 108.  Bejesky, supra note 107, at 285. 
 109.  Hardin, supra note 105, at 1147–49. 
 110.  See generally LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 205–34 (2005) (criticizing the cost-
benefit approach and advocating in favor of a more holistic analysis); Hardin, supra note 
105, at 1162–65 (discussing Ackerman & Heinzerling’s “moral critique” of cost-benefit 
analysis). 
 111.  See HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra note 110, at 11 (characterizing “the atomistic 
[cost-benefit] analysis offered by contemporary economists, [as one] in which a problem is 
severed into its component parts, examined by experts, and [then poorly] reconstructed” 
and noting that “[this] kind of economic thinking . . . is ascendant in public-policy circles 
today”).  
 112.  Cf. Hardin, supra note 105, at 1145–46 (discussing early applications of cost-benefit 
analysis by Congress when enacting environmental legislation such as the Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments, passed in 1972, which “‘limit[ed] the application of technology 
only where the [benefits were] wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving such 
marginal level of reduction,’” and the Toxic Substances Control Act, which “required con-
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larly ill-suited, to analyzing “macro” societal risks such as global warm-
ing.113   
As noted by Richard Lazarus and Oliver Houck, 
“[e]nvironmental protection laws are by their very nature radically 
redistributive.”114  So even though the calls for protection of the enti-
tlements set out in the major environmental statutes were not altered 
in the statutes, the enthusiasm and wisdom of the enforcement of 
such laws was questioned.115  In their seminal book, The Environmental 
Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions, Marc Landy, Marc Rob-
erts, and Stephen Thomas agree with this assessment and also note 
that the EPA may have undertaken cost-benefit analysis even where it 
should not have done so.116 
Additionally, the rhetoric of the 1980 presidential election 
spurred a visible backlash against the role of government in providing 
assistance to the individual.117  Scholars have speculated that the back-
lash was related to the economic woes of the time, and that it resulted 
in more than simply a call to end to welfare.118  There was an emphasis 
placed on the work ethic and on the individual as being responsible 
for her state of life.119  This “Reagan Revolution” reverberates today.120  
                                                        
sideration of the benefits of the substance and the economic costs of the contemplated 
regulation” (footnotes omitted)). 
 113.  Michael Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Macro-Risks: The Challenge for Ra-
tional Risk Regulation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 401, 412 (2011). 
 114.  Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, The Story of Environmental Law, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 2 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). 
 115.  Cf. Hardin, supra note 105, at 1179 (observing that “[President] Reagan capital-
ized on those calls [for rationalized decisionmaking] by . . . requir[ing] agencies to con-
duct a cost-benefit analysis in conjunction with the contemplation or promulgation of all 
major rules”). 
 116.  LANDY, ROBERTS & THOMAS, supra note 66, at 238 (“The Clean Air Act excludes 
economic considerations.  But, in the absence of any threshold for risk, some balancing 
between costs and benefits had to be implicit in the standard setting decision—a reality 
EPA neither acknowledged nor forced Congress to confront.”). 
 117.  See, e.g., Dana Neaçsu, A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and Its Reliance on Non-
governmental Organizations to Provide Social Services, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 405, 415 (2006) (“The 
Reagan Administration . . . did [its] best to end the paternalist social liberal state . . . .”). 
 118.  Cf. id. at 416 (“Surprisingly, by the end of the Carter Administration the welfare 
discourse had become apocalyptic, using the biblical mythology of ‘after the collapse.’  
Shortly thereafter, the Reagan Administration ushered in the beginning of the end when 
‘[i]n 1981, deep cuts in federal aid to states and localities reduced funding to 1968 levels.’” 
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted)). 
 119.  See, e.g., KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 38–39 (2011) (discussing how in the 1980s, social science 
began to drive the discourse on welfare and how Charles Murray used “an economic mod-
el of welfare use, describing the receipt of welfare as an individual choice that stood in op-
position to work” in his influential 1984 book Losing Ground). 
 120.  See Drew Weston, America’s Leftward Tilt?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012, at SR6 (discuss-
ing the lasting effects of Reagan-era political ideals). 
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Arthur McEvoy has written a wonderful piece that links this cultural 
change to the environmental movement, noting that environmental 
law was a notable success of the New Deal coalition, and that the last 
forty years of efforts to undermine the New Deal’s societal protection, 
which began with the Reagan Revolution, necessarily includes attacks 
on the framework of environmental protection.121 
The use of cost-benefit analysis and the call for individual re-
sponsibility merge to emphasize that we are not all in the same boat 
and that we may not deserve to be.  Environmental protection 
grounded in the commonality of the exposure of all, is inapposite to 
the idea that you can change your own circumstances by hard work.  
For example, some could be “less harmed” by environmental impacts 
than others; if one can leave a neighborhood with bad schools and 
fence in her property to keep out thieves, then she can also presuma-
bly move to a location that has fewer environmental problems.122  The 
perception that we are all in the same environmental boat, then, real-
ly begins to wane.  To the extent that the “commons” indicates that 
benefits can accrue to decision makers, while costs accrue to all, the 
embrace of “every person for herself” supports a return to the com-
mons and the idea of individual gain.123  Under this paradigm, the 
government will not protect us, and we do not expect it to.  According 
to The New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof: “In the 1960s, more 
than two-thirds of Democrats and Republicans alike expressed trust in 
government.  That has fallen to about one-third for Democrats—and 
to just 5 percent for Republicans.”124  This trend coincides with what 
Chris Schroeder describes as a change from a “morally outraged” ap-
proach toward environmental compliance to a “coolly analytical ap-
proach.”125 
In addition, income inequality has continued to grow in our so-
ciety since the 1970s, with the exception of parts of the 1990s.  Shortly 
after World War II, the United States entered into the “Golden Age” 
                                                        
 121.  McEvoy, supra note 90 (manuscript at 19–22). 
 122.  See Robert H. Frank, When Low Taxes Don’t Help the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, 
at BU6 (discussing the insulation of wealthy individuals from the problems of society at 
large). 
 123.  See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968) 
(explaining the problem of the commons and how an individualistic outlook may hinder 
social welfare, particularly in the context of pollution, in which the tragedy of the com-
mons means that “we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so long as we be-
have only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers”). 
 124.  Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., It Takes One to Know One, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at 
A27. 
 125.  See generally Chris Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of 
Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 257–58 (1993). 
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of economic growth.126  Incomes grew at rates that exceeded the rate 
of inflation, and “the middle class swelled.”127  The 1970s, however, 
witnessed a reversal of fortune, in which the middle class weakened as 
wage increases fell behind inflation.128  Some scholars dubbed this 
change the “Great U-Turn.”129  It has also been called the “Great Di-
vergence.”130  During the 1970s, income inequality began to rise, in 
both the distribution of household incomes and in the distribution of 
wages.131 
Income inequality is commonly measured in three different ways: 
(1) “the percentage of total income held by [part] of the income dis-
tribution,”132 (2) “the ratio of income” held by one percentile group 
as compared to another percentile group,133 and (3) “one-number-
summary statistics,” such as the Gini Index.134  In their paper, Finan-
cialization and U.S. Income Inequality, 1970-2008, Ken-Hou Lin and 
Donald Tomaskovic-Devey propose that the three most important in-
dicators of income inequality are: (1) labor’s decline in the share of 
national income, (2) the top earners’ “increasing income share,” and 
(3) increasing income divergence among workers.135 
As to the first factor, labor’s decline in the share of national in-
come in the United States began in the 1970s.136 After World War II, 
there was a gradual increase in labor’s share of income.  The share of 
                                                        
 126.  Steven C. Deller, What Has Caused the “Great U-Turn” in Income Inequality?, 
COMMUNITY ECON. NEWSLETTER (Ctr. Cmty. & Eco. Dev. et al.), June 2005, available at 
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/pubs/cenews/docs/ce344.pdf. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Stephanie Moller, Arthur S. Alderson & François Nielsen, Changing Patterns of In-
come Inequality in U.S. Counties, 1970–2000, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1037, 1037–38 (2009). 
 130.  Timothy Noah, The United States of Inequality: The Great Divergence, SLATE (Sept. 3, 
2010, 3:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_great_divergence/ 
features/2010/the_united_states_of_inequality/introducing_the_great_divergence.html.  
 131.  See Moller, Alderson & Nielson, supra 129, at 1090 (“Since the early 1970s, inequal-
ity in the distribution of family income in the United States has been on the rise.”); Noah, 
supra note 130 (“The Great Compression ended in the 1970s. Wages stagnated, inflation 
raged, and by the decade’s end, income inequality had started to rise.”). 
 132.  Leslie McCall & Christine Percheski, Income Inequality: New Trends and Research Di-
rections, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 329, 332 (2010). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id.  The Gini Index measures inequality through a descriptive approach, “giving 
summary information on the income distribution [but] not giving any information about 
the characteristics of the income distribution.”  See generally LORENZO GIOVANNI BELLÙ & 
PAOLO LIBERATI, INEQUALITY ANALYSIS: THE GINI INDEX 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/329/gini_index_040EN.pdf. 
 135.  Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S. Income Ine-
quality, 1970–2008, at 4–5 (Nov. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1954129. 
 136.  Id. (manuscript at 5). 
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income in the private sector, however, then decreased from 66% to 
60% between 1970 and 2008.137  The change differed by industry, with 
declines in manufacturing, transportation, and construction, but with 
increases in the finance and service industries.138  According to the 
Huffington Post, this measure of income inequality has changed even 
more dramatically in the last few years, falling to 57.1%, the lowest 
percentage of income “since the measure was first recorded.”139 
In 2010, the annual median wage fell to $26,364, the lowest level 
since 1999, and incomes continued to drop, falling 6.7% between 
June 2009 and June 2011.140  In comparison, company profits-per-
employee rose in 2010.141  In fact, while wages have consistently fallen 
during the recovery from the recent recession, corporate profits have 
consistently increased during the same time period.142  One explana-
tion could be the emergence of outsourcing in the U.S. economy.143  
Stated briefly, policies that allow American companies to shift capital 
to foreign countries, with lower wages and less stringent working con-
dition controls,144 have given employers a “bargaining advantage,” par-
ticularly in the manufacturing sector.145  The changes in bargaining 
power compound labor’s decline in economic share since the 1970s. 
The second factor, the increase in the income share of top earn-
ers, really began in the 1980s.146  The top decile of income earners 
controlled 31% of total income in the 1970s, while in comparison this 
                                                        
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Jillian Berman, Labor Force’s Share of Income Plunges to Lowest Recorded Level, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2011, 6:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/01 
/labor-forces-share-of-income_n_1124189.html. 
 140.  Jillian Berman, U.S. Median Annual Wage Falls to $26,364 as Pessimism Reaches 10-
Year High, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2012, 8:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/10/20/us-incomes-falling-as-optimism-reaches-10-year-low_n_1022118.html.  
 141.  Berman, supra note 139.  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  See WORKING AMERICA & AFL-CIO, OUTSOURCED: SENDING JOBS OVERSEAS: THE 
COST TO AMERICA’S ECONOMY AND WORKING FAMILIES 5, 7 (2010), available at 
http://staging.workingamerica.org/upload/OutsourcingReport.pdf (“[I]t is clear that 
offshoring has continued and accelerated in recent years—at the same time the wages of 
American workers have stagnated and mass layoffs and job cuts continue to ravage many 
communities.”). But see Dan Ikenson, Outsourcing for Dummies (Including the Willfully Igno-
rant), FORBES (Nov. 11, 2012, 11:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2012/ 
07/11/outsourcing-for-dummies-including-the-willfully-ignorant/ (positing that only a 
small number of Americans have lost their job to outsourcing, which, in fact, filters money 
back into the United States economy). 
 144.  WORKING AMERICA & AFL-CIO, supra note 143, at 7, 22. 
 145.  Andrew Glyn, Explaining Labor’s Declining Share of National Income (Intergov’t Group 
of Twenty-four (IG024), Int’l Monetary Affairs & Dev., Policy Brief No. 4), 
http://www.g24.org/PolicyBriefs/pbno4.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
 146.  Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 135 (manuscript at 5). 
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group controlled 50% of income in 2007.147  In fact, studies have indi-
cated that this change is more profound when examined through a 
narrower lens; the top 0.1% of earners had a 2.6% share of income in 
the 1970s, but a 12.3% share of income in 2007.148  Lin and To-
maskovic-Devey suggest that changes in executive compensation 
among the very top earners strongly influenced this change.149  For 
example, practices such as tying executive compensation to the com-
pensation of “peer” executives led to a doubling of executive compen-
sation between 1993 and 2003.150 
Finally, divergence in wages among workers is the best known of 
the three economic factors associated with rising income inequality.151  
Wage inequality among workers increased by 40% between 1973 and 
2007.152  Generally, the wages of college graduates were 30% greater 
than those of non-graduates in the late 1970s, but “the premium dou-
bled over the next few decades.”153  In addition, employment increases 
concentrated on either largely unskilled workers or on highly skilled 
workers.154 
An important factor in the increase in wage inequality is the de-
cline of organized labor since the 1970s.155  Between the early 1970s 
and 2007, private sector union membership fell from just below 35% 
of male workers to 8%, and from just below 15% of female workers to 
less than 4%.156  During this time period, men’s wage inequality rose 
by 40%, largely between 1978 and 2000.157  Women’s wage inequality, 
                                                        
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See id. (“[C]ompensation has become an increasingly important source of income 
for these top earners.  That is, elite workers now constitute a significant fraction of the 
highest income population.” (citation omitted)). 
 150.  See id. (noting that the doubling of executive compensation “was accomplished in 
part by an institutional tying of executive pay to the pay of other ‘peer’ executives, engi-
neering an upward leapfrogging game in CEO compensation” (citing Thomas A. DiPrete, 
Gregory M. Eirich & Matthew Pittinsky, Compensation Benchmarking, Leapfrogs, and the Surge 
in Executive Pay, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1671, 1673 (2010))). 
 151.  Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 135 (manuscript at 5). 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id.; see also Janet L. Yellen, Economic Inequality in the United States, FRBSF ECON. 
LETTER, Dec. 1, 2006, at 2 (“[F]rom 1973 to 2005, real hourly wages of those in the 90th 
percentile—where most people have college or advanced degrees—rose by 30% or 
more.”). 
 154.  See Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 135 (manuscript at 5) (“The labor market 
also has become more polarized, with the growth of employment concentrated at both 
tails of the skill distribution.” (citation omitted)). 
 155.  Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 
76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 514 (2011). 
 156.  Id. at 514, 516. 
 157.  Id. at 514. 
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which was originally lower than men’s wage inequality, grew at an 
even faster pace.158  Certain theorists and economists have stated that 
this change in unionization is a major cause of wage disparities,159 as 
there is a positive association between unions and wage equaliza-
tion,160 as well as between unions and a reduction in excessive com-
pensation.161 
Differences in educational histories of workers during the growth 
of income inequality are equally important.162  As the economy 
changed, the wages for unskilled workers diverged from the wages for 
skilled workers.163 
The wages for highly skilled workers increased substantially com-
pared to those for less-skilled workers around 1980, impacting con-
temporary workers along with future workers.164  Young white males 
from higher-family-income groups flocked to get college degrees to 
take advantage of this wage differential, while lower income families 
did not respond at the same rate.165  This difference in college attend-
ance widened wage differentials even further.  Overall, technological 
change, workforce change, and increases in foreign trade increased 
the demand for highly skilled workers, leading to an increase in the 
                                                        
 158.  Id.  It should be noted, however, that many of these statistical issues are driven by 
“the top and bottom of the wage distribution,” meaning that this wage differential may be 
more relevant in the discussion of top earner income share, rather than in the discussion 
of wage disparities among workers.  See id. (“Overall trends were driven by movements at 
the top and the bottom of the wage distribution.  Increasing inequality in the late 1970s 
and 1980s reflected falling wages at the bottom and rising wages at the top of the distribu-
tion.  Since the late 1980s, the growth in wage inequality has been propelled by wage in-
creases for the highest-paid workers.” (citation omitted)). 
 159.  See id. at 533 (“As unions declined, not only did the logic of the market encroach 
on what had been the union sector, but the logic of the  market deepened in the nonun-
ion sector, too,  contributing to the rise in wage inequality.”). 
 160.  See id. at 517 (“The theory of union threat has distributional implications. If un-
ions threaten to organize low-wage workers, employers may raise wages, thereby equalizing 
the wage distribution.”). 
 161.  See id. at 518 (“Consistent with the egalitarian effect of union advocacy, studies of 
data from the mid-1970s through the early 2000s find that managerial compensation is 
lower in unionized firms, and managerial employment is lower in highly unionized indus-
tries.” (citation omitted)). 
 162.  See supra text accompanying notes 153–154. 
 163.  See Inequality in America: What Role for Human Capital Policies?, 23 FOCUS 1, 1 (2005), 
available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc233a.pdf (“The slow-
down in the growth in the quality of the U.S. labor force came during a period of increas-
ing wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers.”). 
 164.  See id. (“Around 1980, the measured wage premium for higher-skilled workers in 
the United States began to increase substantially. . . .  Because education is a primary de-
terminant of earnings, these disparate responses to the new market for skills widened ra-
cial, ethnic, and family-related wage differentials, contributing to rising economic inequal-
ity among U.S. households.”). 
 165.  Id. at 1–2.  
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wage premium of college graduates,166 and to even more profound 
differences in wages among workers.167 
This increase in income inequality could have, and obviously has 
had, many effects on our society.168  For example, in public discourse, 
the new “selfishness” of Americans is associated with hyper-
individualism.169  A discussion of individualism and its implications for 
the country’s social concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
one example cited by Tim Mulvaney shows a relationship between in-
come inequality and environmental amenities that may work outside 
of a direct attitudinal shift.  He notes that a 2007 study found a strong 
correlation between income inequality and the presence of beneficial, 
human-friendly urban forestry.170  Mulvaney explains that this differ-
ence is attributable to high-income areas having the property taxes 
and financial support to plant more trees and maintain more wooded 
areas, while the poorer “concrete jungles” do not have such resources 
available.171  According to the study cited by Mulvaney, this difference 
is troubling because the presence of—or lack of—trees can directly 
change property values, lower cooling costs, reduce air pollution, and 
generally improve the aesthetic value of the area.172  This study might 
imply that poor areas are caught in a downward spiral of lessened en-
vironmental and property values, while wealthy areas are able to im-
prove their environmental factors, and thus increase the wealth of 
                                                        
 166.  See Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 155, at 513 (noting that in the market expla-
nation for wage inequality, “technological change, immigration, and foreign trade in-
creased demand for highly skilled workers, raising the premium paid to college graduates” 
(citation omitted)). 
 167.  Cf. Yellen, supra note 153, at 2–4 (“In recent years, globalization and skill-biased 
technological change may have been working in combination to particularly depress the 
wage gains of those in the middle of the U.S. wage distribution . . . .”). 
 168.  See Linette Lopez, This is How Income Inequality Destroys Societies, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 
1, 2011, 1:49 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-negative-effects-of-income-
inequality-on-society-2011-11?op=1 (charting correlations between income inequality and 
“social ills”). 
 169.  See Frank Bruni, Three Muffled Syllables, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at SR3 (lament-
ing the lack of “sacrifice” in the United States and positing that “the rise of interest groups, 
identity politics and cause-specific lobbyists has diminished our attention to, and sense of, 
a communal good”); Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Scott’s Story and the Election, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 18, 2012, at A33 (noting that the number of Republicans who think “it is the respon-
sibility of the government to take care of people who can’t take care of themselves’ has 
slipped from 58 percent in 2007 to just 40 percent today”). 
 170.  Tim Mulvaney, Income Inequality and Trees, ENVTL. LAW PROF BLOG (Sept. 20, 
2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2012/09/income-inequality 
-and-trees.html (discussing the connection between income inequality and “tree cover” 
(citing Pengyu Zhu & Yaoqi Zhang, Demand for Urban Forests in United States Cities, 84 
LANDSCAPE & URB. PLANNING 293 (2008))). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
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those areas.  Though Mulvaney points out that this study does not 
supply any causal link between income inequality and environmental 
factors,173 he notes that it connects urban planning concerns directly 
with environmental amenities,174 which in theory should be available 
to everyone.  Rather than showing the dangers of income inequality, 
Mulvaney suggests that income inequality can have serious impacts on 
environmental justice.175 
Returning to our earlier discussion of the increased individual-
ism in the United States, the political discourse has mirrored the de-
bate over inequality and grown even more individualistic since Presi-
dent Reagan’s time.  Perhaps because of the focus on inequality in the 
2012 presidential election, many columnists and pundits tried to ad-
dress the impacts of this individualism leading up to the election.176  
Liberal and conservative New York Times columnists criticized this in-
dividualism.  According to David Brooks, the Republican party has 
moved “from the Reaganesque language of common citizenship to 
the libertarian language of makers and takers.”177  Brooks argues that 
this individualistic attitude discourages people from taking risks, even 
ones that would be beneficial to society as a whole.178  These individu-
alistic attitudes may also promote irrational views of problems.179  In 
times of distrust and fear, people are more likely to downplay societal 
                                                        
 173.  See id. (“[M]ost significantly, as an empirical matter the 2007 study . . . did not 
seem to offer any causal link between tree cover and income inequality . . . .”). 
 174.  See id. (“[T]he story calls attention to the advantages and challenges of incorporat-
ing green space into local planning and development models.”). 
 175.  Cf. id. (“[T]rees can have significant ‘existence value;’ that is, people might feel a 
lost sense of well-being by virtue of the fact that natural features of the land are depleted 
in areas outside their own daily surroundings.”).  Several recent studies have explored the 
relationship between environmental justice and income inequality.  See generally Kyle 
Crowder & Liam Downey, Interneighborhood Migration, Race, and Environmental Hazards: 
Modeling Microlevel Processes of Environmental Inequality, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1110, 1115–16, 1143 
(2010) (concluding “that family income and householder education significantly decrease 
householder proximity to industrial pollution”); Liam Downey & Brian Hawkins, Race, In-
come, and Environmental Inequality in the United States, 51 SOC. PERSP. 759, 775–78 (2008) 
(analyzing the relationship between race, representation in “environmentally hazardous 
neighborhoods,” and income level).  
 176.  See supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also David Brooks, Thurston Howell 
Romney, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A25 (“The Republican Party, and apparently Mitt 
Romney, too, has shifted over toward a much more hyperindividualistic and atomistic so-
cial view . . . .”). 
 177.  Brooks, supra note 176. 
 178.  Cf. id. (“People are motivated when they feel competent.  They are motivated 
when they have more opportunities.  Ambition is fired by possibility, not by depriva-
tion . . . .”). 
 179.  David Ropeik, Op-Ed., Inside the Mind of Worry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at A11 
(discussing risk perception in the context of the “fear of vaccines” and alluding to a ten-
sion between individual and societal concerns). 
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risks and focus on themselves.180  This individualistic focus is motivat-
ed by the fear of loss; the impact of this attitude is likely to make it 
self-reinforcing.181  Again, without a base of security, the best fruits of 
social cohesion are lost.182 
It is now an accepted position of one of the major political par-
ties in our country that environmental protection should be rationed 
according to benefit.183  This position undermines any concept that a 
person may have a “right” to environmental protection.184  Instead, 
according to economists, it does not matter where rights fall because 
the rights will go to those who value them the most.185  Of course, 
these rights have to be “bought,” and one has to have the assets to do 
that.  Thus, Americans are urged to protect their jobs as opposed to 
being concerned with potentially harmful environmental impacts.186 
This American attitude about individualism can be compared to 
the prevailing attitude in other developed countries, such as Japan 
and countries in the European Union, where income equality and the 
social safety net are perceived as more valuable.187  Income inequality 
                                                        
 180.  Cf. id. (“A societal risk, well off in the future, tends not to trigger the same instinc-
tive alarm—in part, because the hazard isn’t singling any one of us out, individually.  This 
helps explain why concern over climate change is broad, but thin.”). 
 181.  See Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Obama’s New Normal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at SR11 
(suggesting that “voters can adapt to stagnation, and approach it as a kind of grim ‘new 
normal’ rather than a disaster requiring an immediate response”). 
 182.  See David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Conservative Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at A23 
(expressing concern at the disappearance of traditional conservatism, which “wanted to 
preserve a society that functioned as a harmonious ecosystem, in which the different layers 
were nestled upon each other: individual, family, company, neighborhood, religion, city 
government and national government” and suggesting that because Republicans “no 
longer speak in the language of social order,” the Republican party “appeals to people as 
potential business owners, but not as parents, neighbors and citizens”). 
 183.  See John M. Broder, Bashing E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
18, 2011, at A1 (“[T]he leading Republican candidates are all linking environmental regu-
lation to jobs and the economy, suggesting that the nation cannot afford measures that 
impose greater costs on businesses and consumers.”). 
 184.  Cf. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Sets a Lower Limit for Soot Particles in the Air, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 2012, at A11 (reporting that “[s]ix senators, led by Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of 
Utah, wrote [to the administrator of the EPA] expressing concern about [a] new rule,” 
which aims to reduce soot pollution, even though health studies have found that exposure 
to particles from soot pollution “brought a marked increase in heart and lung disease, 
acute asthma attacks and early death”). 
 185.  See supra text accompanying notes 107–116. 
 186.  See, e.g., AmericanJobCreators, Cuccinelli on Cost of Obama EPA’s Utility MACT Job-Crushing Reg-
ulation, YOUTUBE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJp4cV6r32I (express-
ing concern that the EPA’s Maximum Achievable Control Technology (“MACT”) will drive 
up energy costs and move jobs overseas). 
 187.  See, e.g., Deller, supra note 126, at 2 (noting that “[w]hile there is evidence of a 
widening income gap across nearly all developed counties, the gap is . . . much more mod-
est in European economies,” in part because “[w]ithin Europe, unions remain strong and 
government has retained a commitment to social support programs”); Eduardo Porter, 
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in the rest of the developed world is less than that in the United 
States, where it has been increasing at a faster rate.188  While few can 
deny the increase in rational regulation and market power the world 
over, it has come through a very different rhetorical mechanism; the 
issues of entitlements, government inefficiency, and protectionism are 
universally salient, but while the scope of these benefits and issues has 
been roundly debated, the developed world outside of the United 
States still adheres to a broad communal safety net.189 
This American polity that assumes separation of those that can be 
harmed from those that can be benefitted, in turn reinforces these 
notions of individualism and moves people away from understanding 
common harms.  As Professor J.B. Ruhl has noted in his discussion of 
“climate change winners,” in the United States people can perceive 
differences in exposure to environmental harms or benefits, even in 
the face of divergent evidence, because their perception is influenced 
by “biased assimilation,” in which information on environmental top-
ics such as climate change passes through a prism of polarizing politi-
cal views.190 
IV.  WHAT DO WE DO? 
Perhaps these factors—less visible environmental harm, the 
emergence of a new theory of regulation, and an increase in inequali-
ty—are related only by coincidence, but there has been an undenia-
ble sea change in the discussion and public perception of the envi-
                                                        
Inequality Undermines Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2012, at B1 (mentioning the Europe-
an Union and Japan as examples of “advanced economies with a more egalitarian distribu-
tion of income”); Yellen, supra note 153, at 2–3 (“[T]he U.S. has done little to move closer 
to the European model of social protections and the reduction of inequality and pov-
erty.”).  But see Deborah J. Milly, Book Review, 20 GOVERNANCE 549, 549 (2007) (reviewing 
TOSHIAKI TACHIBANAKI, CONFRONTING INCOME INEQUALITY IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES (2006)) (“While the image of an egalitarian Japanese 
income distribution propagated inside Japan and internationally was based on income da-
ta from the late 1960s . . . this pattern has reversed dramatically, particularly since the mid-
1980s.”). 
 188.  Tami Luhby, Global Income Inequality: Where the U.S. Ranks, CNNMONEY (Nov. 8, 
2011, 4:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/08/news/economy/global_income_ 
inequality/index.htm. 
 189.  See, e.g., Richard Cudahy, From Socialism to Capitalism: A Winding Road, 11 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 39, 63 (2010) (describing the welfare state benefits in Western Europe, which in-
cludes universal health care, easily available education, and long-term unemployment in-
surance). 
 190.  See generally J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 206, 242–47 (2012) (“Even without experience of climate change benefits, many 
people and businesses are generally dug in against investing in effective mitigation.  One 
factor is biased assimilation of mixed evidence about a topic, which leads people to select 
the evidence that strengthens their preconceptions.” (footnote omitted)). 
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ronment.  This change must be related to the relative loss in en-
forcement and protection of the environment.191  Without a will, there 
is no way, and no funding, focus, or public pressure to stem this tide.  
Numerous studies have shown that persons and societies will take ac-
tion on environmental problems when and if they perceive high risks 
from inaction.192  The exception to this trend is also informative.  In-
dividuals whose behaviors diverge from these studies are generally 
those who evidence particular concern for others and intergenera-
tional equity and who, as a result, may push for political and policy 
environmental changes even if they themselves do not directly bene-
fit.193 
This fact alone would suggest that we should try and help people 
understand that environmental harms are more immediate to spur 
them into supporting stronger environmental policies and enforce-
ment for themselves and for others.  One need only look at adver-
tisements from environmental public interest organizations to see 
that they have taken these lessons to heart.  Every cute or majestic en-
dangered mammal, from whales to pandas to polar bears to eagles, 
has been used at one time or another to advertise the consequences 
of environmental despoliation.194  More recently, this phenomenon 
has extended to human health, in particular the health of children.  
One of the most compelling advertisements has to be the one used by 
the Sierra Club’s “Beyond Coal” campaign, which juxtaposes a photo-
graph of a coal-fired power plant next to one of an asthmatic child 
                                                        
 191.  See supra Part III. 
 192.  See, e.g., Sammy Zahran et al., Climate Change Vulnerability and Policy Support, 19 
SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 771, 781 (2006) (“[I]ndividuals who perceive climate change as 
harmful to their personal welfare are significantly more likely to support climate change 
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 193.  Id. (“Citizens with an integrated concern for intergenerational equity, carrying 
capacity, and resource scarcity, and who regard the biosphere as deserving of moral con-
sideration, are more willing to assume the costs of climate change prevention.”). 
 194.  See, e.g., Duncan Macleod, Would You Care More for Blue Fin Tuna, INSPIRATION 
ROOM (Apr. 3, 2011), http://theinspirationroom.com/daily/2011/would-you-care-more-
for-blue-fin-tuna/#.UUTSxtaceYT (discussing a print ad campaign created for World Wild-
life Fund France that “connect[s] the plight of the Bluefin Tuna (Thon Rouge) with the 
popular causes of the panda, rhinoceros and gorilla” by depicting bluefin tuna wearing 
panda, gorilla, and rhino masks with the tagline  “Would you care more if I was a pan-
da?”); WWF: Homeless Polar Bear, ADS OF THE WORLD, http://adsoftheworld.com/media/ 
print/wwf_homeless_polar_bear (last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (showing a print ad, created 
by EuroRSCG for the World Wildlife Fund Finland, that depicts a “homeless” polar bear in 
a city alley with the tagline: “Animals around the world are losing their habitats due to cli-
mate change.  By choosing a hybrid or fuel efficient car, you can help prevent this.  Take 
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and states: “Your local coal burning power plant has a new filter.  His 
name is Danny.”195 
But despite the immediacy and the effectiveness of advertising, it 
is not clear that these ads work or that they do so consistently in get-
ting the message across that environmental harms are immediate or 
that they can be solved in an understandable way.  It is not enough 
that we see the problem; we also have to understand it and how it can 
be solved.  Zahran, Brody, Grover, and Vedlitz, citing the work of Paul 
Stern on the four causal variables that influence environmentally sig-
nificant behavior—attitudinal variables, personal capability variables, 
contextual variables, and habits and routine196—remind us that per-
sonal capability is a prime causal variable in effecting environmentally 
positive behaviors.197  If you do not know what to do, then you will not 
do anything.198  The connections between hunting and extinction and 
visible pollution and visible harm meet this criteria, but concerns 
about loss of habitat and the future effect of climate change, possibly 
the most serious problems we have faced, do not. 
Compare the images from the 1960s and 1970s with the images 
of today.  The “silent spring” could be made vibrant by getting rid of 
something clear like DDT, and because there were substitutes, easy 
enough to do.199  But, we had to have the political will to ask for it.  
The Cuyahoga River was polluted, so we could stop pouring foul 
things from factories into it (as the Dennis the Menace comics 
urged).200  Trash was everywhere, so we could stop throwing it or pick 
it up.  But, these problems were easy to address outside the legal 
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 199.  See supra text accompanying notes 31–37. 
 200.  See supra text accompanying notes 38–47, 84. 
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framework.201  More recently, dolphin-safe tuna was a rallying cry of 
the 1990s, and there is no doubt that this clear message found many 
adherents.202  Why?  Because each adherent could identify the prob-
lem and bring to bear her own energy to address it, and could do so 
in a way that, when combined with others’ actions, would be effec-
tive.203 
But the problems of today are different.  Maybe coal-burning 
plants are using Danny and Peter as “filters,” but we are not sure what 
to do about it.  Do we tell the plants to add filtering equipment?  Do 
we ask Congress to shutter all coal-fired power plants, which have ex-
isted in our world for decades?204  Maybe, but so far there has been no 
consistent message like the one to end DDT.205 
And what about the polar bear?  Cute to be sure, and endan-
gered as well, but we cannot solve the problem by just stopping or re-
stricting the use of one chemical like DDT, or one activity, like hunt-
ing.  Instead, everything we do affects the climate, and thus the polar 
bear’s habitat.206  We are not even sure what we should want to do.  
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The Center for Biological Diversity’s petition regarding polar bears 
pointed out the dangers to polar bear habitats posed by oil and gas 
exploration, but it could just as easily have focused on ending a myri-
ad of federal activities that are related to greenhouse gases.207  If an 
individual wants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, what can that 
individual do?  Reduce driving?  Yes.208  But more difficult questions 
follow.  What products do we buy?  Where should we get electricity?  
In which kinds of neighborhoods should we live?  The solution to this 
problem is not as clear as the solutions to the traditional problems 
were. 
Some environmentalists try to list the necessary actions, but even 
this can seem simplistic.209  Moreover, people may perceive these ac-
tions as not having an effect on the problem as a whole.210  A 2009 ar-
ticle from a group of environmentalists and sociologists documented 
how much individual behavior could impact climate change, making 
such behavior a truly important factor for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.211  But that message has yet to make its way fully into policy. 
Today, there is also a concerted opposition to effective messag-
ing, which did not exist as much in response to the environmental 
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omitted)). 
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campaigns of the 1970s.  Rather than having one company that makes 
one product such as DDT, advocates for controlling climate change 
have to face a whole fossil fuel industry made up of the largest com-
panies in the world, whose motivations are clear.  This opposition has 
been shown to be quite sophisticated and even capable of misinfor-
mation.212 
Perhaps then, slogans and advertising are necessary but not suffi-
cient.  What has to be advertised is not only a catch phrase, but also 
the truth in all its complexity.  When people are told that coal-fired 
plants are bad, they need to see more than pictures of only one part 
of the story.  They need to be told about the effects of closing coal-
fired power plants on electricity prices and workers, other electricity 
options, and the impacts on competition and climate change.213  
Clearer education and greater lists of choices have seemed to work in 
other Western cultures,214 and I believe could work here in the United 
States. 
The issue of our citizens not caring because they think that they 
can escape the harm or that they can be relatively advantaged is hard-
er to reverse.  These attitudes have been reinforced and co-opted by 
those opposing environmental protection and enforcement.215  Many, 
if not all, of the messages opposed to doing more about air, water, 
species extinction, or the climate, focus extensively on not having to 
respect the benefits to and rights of other people.216  Recognizing and 
directly addressing this phenomenon is important and may do some 
good,217 but to the extent that it is part of a broader societal fragmen-
tation, I cannot claim to know what is to be done.  Moreover, in-
creased poverty means that many people are not able to directly effec-
tuate changes that may be necessary.218 
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There have been some interesting rumblings from religious or-
ganizations that emphasize the moral underpinnings of action, in-
cluding protection of the environment and caring for those who are 
harmed by environmental degradation.219  Most recently, for example, 
the newly elected Pope focused on care for the environment in his 
first public homily.220  This type of multi-faceted approach may be part 
of the solution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Both the perception of less harm and the move to hyper-
individualism are to blame for the waning sense of environmental 
immediacy, and together, these phenomena exacerbate the perceived 
remoteness of environmental harm or an ability to do anything about 
it.221  If we at least try to be clearer about the complex nature of the 
problems we face and their potential solutions, point out that people 
still do have rights in the environment, and explain that this is a mor-
al issue, perhaps we will bring back some immediacy and communitar-
ian ideals.222  Again, proposals to recognize the policy gains that could 
come from individual behavior would bring a helpful imprimatur.223 
Because of the nature of the interaction between societal norms 
and perception of harm, the message of environmental protection 
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and regulation must come from those in leadership positions.  If that 
occurs, then we might see the powers of the religious and moral 
movements combine with the facts provided by the scientific move-
ment begin to reverse the decline in concern about our environment 
and its enforcement of its laws.  Then, the problem will not be “too 
big,” just “big.”  We can attack the big problems in the environment; 
we have done it before.224 
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